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COMMENT
Corporate Divorce - Japanese Style
Henry T. King, Jr.*
HE PROSPECT of corporate divorce in a joint venture in Japan
raises special problems for the foreign investor, which are
unique to Japan. In other areas of the world, when things went
sour with a joint venture, the U.S. partner could just move in and
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buy out his partner. This al-
ternative has not been available
in Japan because of governmen-
tal restrictions on foreign own-
ership,1 although these restric-
tions have been recently some-
what liberalized.' In addition,
American businesses have found
it difficult to operate wholly
owned subsidiaries in Japan be-
cause of cultural and language
differences and because of dif-
ferences in Japanese business
traditions and practices. Fur-
thermore, if an American partner in a joint venture were to attempt
to force out his Japanese partner, the American company would
probably find that the collective attitude of the Japanese business
community toward him would be quite cold, rigid, and unified. In
* The views expressed herein are those of the writer and not necessarily those of
TRW Inc., with which he is associated.
1 The Foreign Investment Law (Gaishi ni kansuru h6ritsu kankeish6rei) (Law No.
163, 1950) applies to any degree of investment, not merely majority shareholding, but
in the past the foreign investor was largely relegated to a minority position. D. HEN-
DERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN (1973) is probably the best general study of
foreign investment in Japan, particularly as to historical aspects.
2 Cabinet Resolution, Concerning Liberalization of Direct Incoming Investment,
April 27, 1973. Note that no significant amendment to the Foreign Investment Law
was needed to carry out the liberalization program because of the vast discretion vested
by that law in the Cabinet, the Foreign Investment Council, and the government min-
istries. See, generally, F. L. Hartman, "Japanese Foreign Investment Regulation:'Se-
mantics and Reality," 18 N.Y. LAW FORUM 355 (1972). Even under the Fifth Liber-
alization, a number of industries are still subject to restrictions on foreign ownership.
See, Note, The Fifth Liberalization of Capital Movements into Japan infra at 279.
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this ostracized position, it would be exceedingly difficult for the
American company to attract an alternative Japanese partner.
In addition, after a joint venture in Japan has been terminated,
the American company may find itself in competition with its former
Japanese partner. Since many Japanese firms enter into joint ven-
tures with the gaining of access to technology as their primary goal,
when the joint venture terminates, it may be difficult, if not impos-
sible, to avoid use of this technology, especially where it is un-
patented, by the Japanese partner. Suffice it to say, it just does not
seem practical for you to assume that your technology can just be
gathered up and returned to you when the joint venture is termi-
nated.
It is common for a Japanese firm to be engaged in several joint
ventures. Your joint venture may be just one of many, in which
case your Japanese partner may be able to favor his other joint ven-
tures, especially where they are prospering, and ignore or neglect
your interests when insurmountable differences arise.
It is vital that you spell out in detail, in the joint venture agree-
ment, the circumstances that will trigger termination. Normally, the
licensing agreement should terminate at the same time; if the licens-
ing agreement is not to terminate, the conditions of its extension
should be specified. The agreement must also provide for strict
limits on the use of the technology during the life of the joint ven-
ture. For instance, it might be best to bind your partner directly
to secrecy at all times regarding the know-how transmitted and to
commit him not to use that know-how without your prior approval.
This committment should survive the joint venture agreement.
If it is deemed desirable that, in the event of termination, the
joint enterprise is to continue without the American partner's fur-
ther involvement, the agreement should provide for the mandatory
purchase by the Japanese partner of the American party's interest, at
a predetermined price, or at a price determined by an agreed-upon
formula. Disposition of the equipment used by the joint venture
should also be specified in the agreement. In fact, you should get
all understandings in writing, signed by all the parties. Do not rely
on verbal understandings, as is done in many European countries,
where lawyers oftentimes are not even present at negotiations.
There are no special United States tax problems incident to a joint
venture termination other than the capital gain or loss realized at
the termination. Where the joint venture has been operating at a
loss, it is possible that on dissolution the U.S. partner will realize
19741 251.
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an overall gain, due to the unrealized value of the venture's assets
(in turn due to the enhanced value of the yen vis-4-vis the dollar),'
and thus, the dissolution may not involve a non-recurring loss on
the U.S. company's financial statement.
Some problems may arise from the Japanese tax laws. In addi-
tion, problems may arise from the matter of Japanese government
clearances4 on the termination, and from the currency clearances
incident to returning funds to the United States. As a general mat-
ter, you will find that the transfer of buy-out funds requires Japa-
nese government approval; you will also find that the Japanese in-
vestment validation regulations require a mandatory report on the
termination of a licensing agreement between a foreign licensor
and a Japanese licensee.6
It should be stipulated in the joint venture agreement that dis-
putes are to be settled by arbitration pursuant to the Japanese-
American Arbitration Agreement of September 16, 1952. 7 This
avoids litigation in the Japanese courts (and conversely, from your
Japanese partner's point of view, avoids litigation in American
courts). It should be specified in the arbitration clause exactly
where the arbitration is to be held and which law will govern dis-
position of the substantive and procedural issues involved in the dis-
3 Before August 1971, when the yen was revalued to 308 yen (central rate) to the
dollar, the yen had been pegged at 360 yen to the dollar, the parity rate established with
the International Monetary Fund in May 1953. Since February 13, 1973, the yen has
been floating and the exchange rate has fluctuated between a low of 306.30 yen to the
dollar and to a high of 259 yen per dollar.
4 Under present Japanese foreign exchange regulations, proceeds from the dispo-
sition by tlhe foreign investor of shares of the Japanese corporation may be repatriated if
such proceeds are deposited directly into a nonresident free yen account of such investor.
5 The only condition for remitability of proceeds from the disposition of validated
shares is that the price at which the shares were sold is "fair." Determination as to
whether the price is fair or not is left, to the foreign exchange bank. In case there should
be any uncertainty as to the fairness of the price, the matter should be referred to the
Bank of Japan. Thus, the safest way to ensure remitability of the proceeds would be
to obtain the Bank of Japan's informal clearance in advance.
6 Japanese government approval (validation) of the license agreement normally
contains the following condition: "In case the subject agreement should be canceled,
suspended, or terminated due to expiration of its term, report to that effect shall be
made to the competent ministers without delay." Pursuant to this condition, the term-
ination of the license agreement must be reported to the relevant ministers through
the Bank of Japan.
7 Despite the prevalence of arbitration clauses in Japanese - U.S. commercial
agreements as a means of resolving disputes, it still may be true that a formal arbitration
proceeding may be even more rare than a lawsuit in trans-Pacific transactions. The
overwhelming majority of disputes are settled informally without resort to court or
arbitration.
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pute. The results of the arbitrator's decision can be enforced by
the courts of either country. 8
The overriding cause of joint venture termination is, of course,
lack of business success, the causes of which may include:
(1) Lack of Clear Understanding Between the Parties
One must be wary of the unarticulated assumptions of both
parties when they entered the joint venture. In Japan, there is a
distinct need for accurate communication. The partners should
work out a document detailing the plans and anticipations of the
parties and a guide for united action. It is vital that the neces-
sary mutuality exist from the beginning. The American partner
should not attempt to oversell the potential of his products.
(2) Lack of Compatibility Between the Parties
The key element in a successful joint venture is having the
right partner. You should note that geography plays an important
part in influencing the behavior and attitudes of 'persons from dif-
ferent parts of Japan. Furthermore, before the venture agreement is
finalized, the American partner should be certain that his future
partner does not have other business interests that might conflict
with the interests of the joint venture.
(3) Lack of Independent Status of the Joint Venture
Ideally, the joint venture should have its own personality, sepa-
rate and distinct from that of the Japanese partner. This is often
hard to accomplish when the venture is staffed with personnel of the
Japanese partner; it is hard for these employees to differentiate the
joint venture's interests from those of the Japanese parent. For
example, in the area of marketing, the temptation will be to allow
the Japanese parent to handle the export sales distribution or re-
placement sales. Should this occur, accounting techniques should be
used which carefully delineate the profits of the venture and keep
them separate from the profits of the Japanese partner. Provisions
8Art. IV(2) of Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the
United States and Japan of 1953; also U.N. Convention of 1958. Under the Japanese
Code of Civil Procedures, the arbitration award has the same effect as a final judgment
and can be enforced by execution judgment; Arts. 800, 802. See, American President
Lines v. C. Subra KK (Tokyo Dt. Ct., Oct. 23, 1959), translated in 6 JAPAN ANN.
INT'L L. 203 (1962); Casaregi Compagnia Di Navigazione E Commercio SPA v. Nishi
Shoji KK (Tokyo Dt. Ct., Aug. 20, 1959), translated in 5 JAPAN ANN. INT'L L. 112
(1961).
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should be made in the joint venture agreement for an audit of these
operations by the American partner or by a third party.
(4) Other Business Reasons
Other reasons for the termination of a joint venture, which from
past history and experience are identifiable, include lack of sufficient
sales, lack of profits, failure of the venture to carry out its most im-
portant obligations under the license agreement, stalemate within
the board of directors, failure of the parties to agree on the budget
for the future or on past financial statements, and bankruptcy of one
of the partners in the venture.
These reasons are immediate, factual, and identifiable. Those
specified in the preceding three paragraphs are more fundamental.
All underly the catch-all reason for joint venture failures - name-
ly, lack of business success.
Conclusions
Don't be in too much of a hurry to enter into a Japanese mar-
riage. If it becomes necessary to extricate yourself from a joint ven-
ture your Japanese partner generally will have more leverage than
you in accomplishing that extrication, if not successfully, at least
with a minimum of adverse consequences, if only because he is
playing on his own home ground.
Take your time in selecting your partner; develop criteria for
your future partner and be sure that these criteria are met.
Take your time in negotiating your venture agreement. Remem-
ber that your prospective partner's nod in a negotiation may be
merely a mark of politeness and not an indication of understanding.
Full use should be made of a translator if there arises any doubt.
Absolute mutuality of understanding concerning the objectives and
operation of the joint venture and concerning the responsibilities of
each of the partners is the basic objective which must be fully met
for success to be achieved. Considerable patience must be part of
your arsenal. Distance, language barriers, and the typical turnovers
in American personnel make a subsequent understanding far more
difficult to achieve if an initial understanding has not been reached
at the beginning.
You can afford to be selective and cautious in expanding opera-
tions into Japan which just is not as attractive an area for invest-
ment as it once was. It's infrastructure, the best example of which is
[Vol. 6: 250
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probably the distribution system, requires much further develop-
ment. It is a relatively high cost area in which to operate; wage
rates and fringe benefits, for example, are exploding at the rate of
about 2 5 percent per year. It also has all of the problems associated
with highly developed industry, such as pollution and the energy
shortage. There is also an acute shortage of available land. Fur-
thermore, Japan's lack of natural resources and overcrowding ac-
centuate the problems which modern industry faces all over the world.
The prospects for success of a new business enterprise in Japan havefallen considerably in the last few years except for those situations
where the foreign investor is able to fill a special need in Japan or
supply desired technology.
Above all, protect your technology. Watch your patent situa-
tion closely and police it carefully. The Japanese respect patents,
and your patent situation at the outset will be a key factor in deter-
mining what kind of deal you get with your Japanese partner. It
is your basic lever, and technological virginity is normally a pre-
requisite to any successful venture. Hopefully, your patent position
will adequately protect you from competition in patented items from
your former partners when the joint venture is terminated.
Finally, even though you will probably have to go the joint ven-
ture route in Japan for logistical, cultural, and other reasons, you
will want to try to get as much equity ownership as possible and
an equal voice in critical business decisions. Maximization of your
equity position will afford you a decided influence on the operation
of the joint venture, will aid you in taking corrective steps in the
event the situation does not progress according to your expectations,
and will increase your leverage in the event of a breakup. In short,
you should have as many votes on your side as possible when the
crunch comes and you need them.
9 According to an estimate of the Economic Planning Agency of Japan, the averageincrease in the level of wages since April 1974 was 31.9%.
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